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controlling for GDP per capita, institutional quality and land area. At the regional level, the 
key result is unchanged. The magnitude and significance of this result is shown to vary by 
global region. Two stage least squares results, using distance from the equator as an 
instrument at the macro level support the simple OLS results and allow us to have some 
confidence that the causality runs from corruption to infrastructure. Finally, it is shown that 
within country variation in corruption has a significant effect on regional infrastructure. 
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1 Introduction
When asked to name some of the key problems facing developing countries, many people,
experts and layman alike, will answer corruption and infrastructure. The importance of
these factors is borne out by those on the ground. For example, nearly 84% of firms in Niger
feel that corruption is a major constraint to their operations according to the World Bank’s
Enterprise Surveys (ES).1 It is important to note that this is not just a Sub-Saharan African
problem. On average, the problem is worst in the Middle East and North Africa region
(57%) though even in the high-income OECD sample the data show that some firms consider
corruption to be a hindrance (14%). Dissatisfaction with infrastructure is also widespread.
In terms of transportation (electricity) infrastructure, 50% (63%) of respondents in Niger
identified it as an obstacle. These problems are worst in Sub-Saharan Africa (27% and
49%) but again are still an issue in the high-income OECD sample (11% and 16%). The
phenomena of corruption and unsatisfactory infrastructure thus seem to be a particular
problem in developing and transition countries but are still to be found in richer economies.
Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) was an early exposition of the link between corruption and in-
frastructural quality. Amongst other findings, they show that corruption is associated with
a lower quality of infrastructure across a range of indicators. Del Monte and Papagni (2001)
find that corruption has a negative effect on the efficiency (in terms of economic growth)
of expenditures on public investment in a sample of Italian regions. Bose, Capasso and
Murshid (2008) present a model in which corruption is only detrimental to infrastructural
quality once it passes a threshold and supports this argument with empirical evidence. Us-
ing an early version of the ES data in conjunction with other data, Kenny (2009) finds a
correlation between measures of corruption and some measures of infrastructural quality,
though as Kenny himself emphasises, the sample size available to him is very small. The
first contribution of this paper is to revisit this question with a new dataset that arguably
contains more satisfactory measures of both variables. Corruption emerges as a significant
correlate of infrastructural quality in line with many existing papers in this literature.
These papers for the most part do not address issues of endogeneity, though many of them
are not attempts to establish a causal relationship. Endogeneity is a concern in two regards
when investigating the link between corruption and infrastructure. Firstly, the possibility of
common and unobservable causes for both the level of corruption and quality of infrastruc-
ture cannot be discounted. Secondly, it is conceivable that countries or regions with worse
infrastructure will tend to have more corruption. The second contribution made here is to
address this endogeneity. Corruption is shown to be an important factor in determining
infrastructure.
1The statistics quoted are taken from the most recent data available for each country which is not
necessarily the same year for each country.
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The final and most important contribution of this paper is to extend the analysis to the
regional level. The link between regional, or local, infrastructure and regional corruption
has not yet been studied widely and the ES data allows one to do so. Two important results
emerge from this exercise. Firstly, a higher level of corruption in a region is associated with
poorer infrastructure. Secondly, the variation from the national average in corruption is
associated with both a lower level of infrastructure both in general and in relation to the
national average.
These results have important policy implications. If, as is evidenced by the data, more
corrupt countries have infrastructure that is not acceptable in the eyes of business, then any
policy that sees infrastructure as the path to development needs to recognise this. In terms
of regional development, the results suggest that regional development and infrastructural
policies need to take account of both the local degree of corruption and of the within country
variation. Corruption has been shown to have negative relationships with important factors
such as growth (e.g. Mauro (1995)), foreign direct investment (e.g. Wei (2000)), inequality
and poverty (e.g. Gupta, Davoodi and Alonso-Terme (2002)), individual well-being (e.g.
Gillanders (2011)), environmental policy (e.g. Fredriksson and Svensson (2003)), inflation
(e.g. Al-Marhubi (2000)), attitudes to the political system (e.g. Anderson and Tverdova
(2003)) and the quality of regulation (e.g. Breen and Gillanders (2012)). The potential
importance of infrastructure for growth has been examined by theorists such as Age´nor
(2010) while Esfahani and Ramırez (2003) present a structural model and conclude that
infrastructure is a considerable boon in terms of GDP. Wang (2003) finds that electricity
matters for child mortality and Fernald (1999) finds that transport infrastructure is good
for the productivity of firms in vehicle intensive industries. Thus, there is a large body
of evidence that both corruption and infrastructure are important factors in an economy.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data, sections 3
and 4 present the country level and regional level results respectively, and the final section
concludes.
2 Data
The main source of data on the variables of interest for this paper is the World Bank’s En-
terprise Surveys (ES) database. These representative firm level surveys collect information
on a wide range of topics and have been widely used in empirical work. The ES team provide
country level averages of the key variables and I generate the regional level indicators from
the raw firm level data.2 Unfortunately, the data is not suitable for panel data analysis as
the surveys have been conducted only once in some countries and in different years. The
2See http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/Methodology for the full methodology.
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ES infrastructure and corruption variables used here come from survey questions that ask
firms to state how much of an obstacle various factors are to their operation. Respondents
can answer on a scale from zero (no obstacle) to four (very severe obstacle) on each factor.
These measures have some important advantages over other commonly used variables.
Firstly, as opposed to the often used Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) compiled by Trans-
parency International (TI), the ES corruption measure is not based on the perceptions of
experts. It is a measure of perceptions but the perceptions of those directly affected by
and who have experienced corruption. Another popular measure of corruption is the World
Bank’s Control of Corruption (CC) measure produced by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi
(2010). As CC is highly correlated with the World Bank’s Rule of Law (RL) measure of
institutional quality and other such variables, it is difficult for one to separate and identify
the effects of corruption and general institutional quality when they are included simulta-
neously.3 Both of these alternative measures of corruption will be used in checks of the
robustness of the main result. These variables cannot be used when we turn to examine
regional level results as they are only computed at the national level.
The infrastructure variables used here measure how much firms perceive each type of infras-
tructure to be an obstacle whereas the infrastructure variables used by Tanzi and Davoodi
(1997), Bose, Capasso and Murshid (2008) and others are intended as measures of the qual-
ity of infrastructure. It is well known that these quality measures are far from perfect. For
example, Bose et al. point out that taking the length of paved roads as a measure of trans-
portation infrastructure ignores the issue of width and measures based on the proportion
of roads that are paved lead to large countries being penalised [Bose, Capasso and Murshid
(2008); pp1178]. Like the ES corruption variable, the infrastructure measures I shall use
here are based on how much of an obstacle firms find the type of infrastructure. Holding
countries with different levels of development and different types of economy and produc-
tion to the same external standards of infrastructure, even if they are perfectly objective,
would be an inferior choice in the context of the current question. The specific infrastructure
questions used relate to transportation infrastructure and electricity infrastructure at the
country level, and to these two plus telecommunications infrastructure at the regional level.
The variables of interest are the percentage of firms in a country or region who responded
that the factor in question was a major or very severe obstacle to their operations. Figures
1 and 2 plot the macro relationships between infrastructure and corruption using the pooled
data. Both figures show a relationship between the two with it being particularly strong
in the case of transportation infrastructure. The data on distance from the equator were
obtained from Parker (1997). All other variables were obtained from the World Development
Indicators (WDI) and the TI and ES datasets.
3The absolute value of the raw correlation between RL and CC in the sample is 0.87 whereas it is 0.40
between RL and the ES corruption measure.
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Figure 1: Country Level Transport Infrastructure and Corruption
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Figure 2: Country Level Electricity Infrastructure and Corruption
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3 Country Level Results
The general form of the model used in estimating the relationship between corruption and
infrastructure quality is of the form:
INFit = α+ β1CORit + β2GDPPCit + β3INSTit + β4AREAit + ǫit (1)
where INFit is either the ES country level measure of transport or of electricity infrastruc-
ture, CORit a measure of corruption, GDPPCit is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita,
AREAit is the natural logarithm of land area in square kilometres, and ǫit is an error term
of the standard type.
The model is estimated using pooled OLS due to the fact that, as mentioned in Section 2
above, the ES data does not (as of yet) form a panel of sufficient dimension. As unobserved
heterogeneity is always a concern, it will be important to check that the main results are
robust to the inclusion of country specific dummy variables. The additional controls are
included to capture the potential deep determinants of a country’s infrastructure. The first is
GDP per capita as a control for the level of economic development and prosperity. This data
comes from the WDI. The second is institutional quality as measured by the World Bank’s
Rule of Law variable. I include this variable as there is a long standing literature that has
explored the relationship between institutional quality and aspects of infrastructural quality.
Henisz (2002) provides an overview of this literature. Finally, land area is controlled for as it
seems sensible to allow for countries of different sizes to have different levels of infrastructure,
regardless of other considerations.
Table 1 presents results obtained from running this model on the ES measures of transport
(Panel A) and electricity (Panel B) infrastructure. The first column of each panel establishes
that there is a statistically significant relationship between the ES measure of corruption
and both of the infrastructure variables. Further, the R2 statistics indicate that a large
proportion of the variance in infrastructural quality across countries can be accounted for
by corruption alone. These large R2 statistics are not present in columns 2 and 3 where
alternative measures of corruption are used, though corruption remains highly significant
(though the signs differ from Column 1 as these variables give bigger numbers to countries
with less corruption). This association remains in the face of country fixed effects, as can
be seen in Column 4.
More importantly, the magnitude of the association is economically meaningful. The results
of the first column indicate that a one standard deviation - approximately 20% - increase
in the corruption variable is associated with an increase of roughly 7% and 10% in the
transportation and electricity infrastructure variables respectively. In both cases this is
about 0.4 of a standard deviation. This is about half of the difference between the Europe
5
Table 1: Country Level Results I: Baseline Results
Panel A: Transport Infrastructure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 4.857∗∗∗ 23.539∗∗∗ 16.220∗∗∗ 11.835∗ 27.429∗∗∗
(1.219) (2.343) (0.850) (6.714) (7.193)
Enterprise Surveys Corruption Measure 0.370∗∗∗ 0.337∗∗∗ 0.385∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.125) (0.042)
Corruption Perceptions Index -1.867∗∗∗
(0.598)
Control of Corruption Index -2.824∗∗
(1.149)
Natural Log of GDP Per Capita -2.585∗∗∗
(0.806)
Rule of Law Index 3.308∗∗
(1.406)
Natural Log of Land Area in Square -0.269
Kilometres (0.340)
Country Fixed Effects NO NO NO YES NO
R2 0.32 0.04 0.02 0.82 0.35
N 224 205 220 224 216
Panel B: Electricity Infrastructure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 13.646∗∗∗ 45.872∗∗∗ 28.356∗∗∗ 35.608∗∗∗ 77.707∗∗∗
(2.950) (4.299) (1.578) (11.177) (16.366)
Enterprise Surveys Corruption Measure 0.508∗∗∗ 0.571∗∗∗ 0.501∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.209) (0.074)
Corruption Perceptions Index -4.562∗∗∗
(1.107)
Control of Corruption Index -6.277∗∗∗
(2.155)
Natural Log of GDP Per Capita -6.121∗∗∗
(1.709)
Rule of Law Index 3.189
(2.626)
Natural Log of Land Area in Square -1.525∗
Kilometres (0.792)
Country Fixed Effects NO NO NO YES NO
R2 0.19 0.07 0.04 0.85 0.26
N 224 205 220 224 216
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗and ∗∗∗indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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and Central Asia sample and the Africa sample in terms of transport infrastructure and one
third of the difference between the two in terms of electricity infrastructure.
The final column includes the other potential determinants of infrastructural quality outlined
above. GDP per capita is significantly correlated with both measures with richer countries
tending to have better infrastructure as one would expect. Firms in countries with better
institutions tend to be less satisfied with infrastructure, though this relationship is only
significant in Panel A. This is perhaps contrary to what one would expect a priori. One
explanation is that in countries with good institutions, there is a higher expectation of,
say, good roads and that this effect is greater than any tendency for good institutions to
provide better infrastructure. Another plausible explanation is that the institutional quality
is endogenous in much the same way that corruption may be. Finally, there is no strong
evidence that the size of a country plays a role.
Having established that there is a relationship in general, it is good practice to see if this
relationship varies by geographical region. For example, Asiedu (2002) and Blonigen and
Wang (2005) have demonstrated this to be an worthwhile exercise in the FDI literature.
This is particularly important if one wishes to offer even broad policy advice to developing
countries. Table 2 divides the sample into four general regions - Africa (including North
Africa), Europe and Central Asia (ECA), Latin America and Caribbean (LAC), and the
Rest of the World (RoW).
Panel A shows that in most groups the relationship between corruption and transport infras-
tructure is significant and sizeable. Only in Column 8 is the corruption variable insignificant.
This is the RoW sample with the additional controls. It should be borne in mind that the
RoW sample is a rather small and heterogeneous sample. Thus the RoW results should be
treated with extra caution. The coefficient is largest in Africa and it is also worth noting
that the size of the country plays a significant role in this sample with larger countries tend-
ing to have better transport infrastructure in the eyes of firms. The story seems to be very
different when it comes to electricity infrastructure, as can be seen in Panel B. In this case
corruption only has a significant association with infrastructure in the ECA sample. Once
again, country size is inversely related to firms’ perceptions of infrastructure in Africa though
not in either the ECA or LAC samples. A general point that emerges from these tables is
that there is a relationship between corruption and infrastructure but that the efficacy of
any policy based on this relationship will be dependent on where the policy is to be carried
out and on the type of infrastructure.
Of course, to be able to offer credible policy advice one must provide at least a certain degree
of evidence that the relationship is free of endogeneity bias. As outlined above, there are
convincing arguments that the prevalence of corruption and the degree of infrastructural
quality are endogenous. Distance from the equator (DE) is used as an instrumental variable
7
Table 2: Country Level Results II: Sample Splits
Panel A: Transport Infrastructure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Africa Europe & Central Asia Americas & Caribbean Rest of the World
Constant 11.717∗∗∗ 43.563∗∗∗ 1.843 -13.976 14.078∗∗∗ 15.282 10.025∗∗∗ 34.346
(2.341) (15.799) (1.573) (13.648) (3.038) (16.114) (3.402) (25.323)
Enterprise Surveys Corruption Measure 0.391∗∗∗ 0.404∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗ 0.345∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗ 0.312∗∗ 0.242∗∗ 0.070
(0.062) (0.070) (0.075) (0.074) (0.064) (0.128) (0.114) (0.096)
Natural Log of GDP Per Capita -2.071 0.885 -0.289 -0.345
(1.999) (1.712) (1.833) (3.020)
Rule of Law Index -2.258 1.072 4.033 0.103
(3.609) (2.574) (2.911) (3.056)
Natural Log of Land Area in Square -1.651∗∗ 0.699 -0.345 -1.578∗∗
Kilometres (0.811) (0.634) (0.616) (0.690)
R2 0.40 0.50 0.25 0.29 0.10 0.15 0.19 0.20
N 54 51 96 96 47 46 27 23
Panel B: Electricity Infrastructure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Africa Europe & Central Asia Americas & Caribbean Rest of the World
Constant 41.802∗∗∗ 118.258∗∗∗ -0.426 -18.541 37.647∗∗∗ 44.301 11.613∗ 72.096
(7.382) (24.304) (1.573) (20.164) (7.130) (31.911) (6.633) (51.468)
Enterprise Surveys Corruption Measure 0.153 0.118 0.664∗∗∗ 0.691∗∗∗ -0.017 0.147 0.706∗∗∗ 0.598∗∗
(0.143) (0.169) (0.136) (0.131) (0.135) (0.226) (0.156) (0.209)
Natural Log of GDP Per Capita -4.589 4.151 -0.510 -7.336
(3.401) (2.827) (3.552) (4.967)
Rule of Law Index -7.969 -4.674 3.305 -8.280
(7.717) (4.108) (4.956) (6.354)
Natural Log of Land Area in Square -4.068∗∗ -1.299 -0.794 -0.749
Kilometres (1.738) (1.056) (0.970) (2.145)
R2 0.02 0.19 0.34 0.36 0.00 0.04 0.37 0.44
N 54 51 96 96 47 46 27 23
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗and ∗∗∗indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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Table 3: Country Level Results III: IV Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Type of Infrastructure: Transport Electricity
Constant -17.363∗∗∗ 23.360∗ -32.741∗∗∗ 70.149∗∗∗
(5.474) (13.168) (11.223) (27.011)
Enterprise Surveys Corruption Measure 1.030∗∗∗ 1.128∗∗∗ 1.886∗∗∗ 1.881∗∗∗
(0.169) (0.205) (0.364) (0.391)
Natural Log of GDP Per Capita -4.381∗∗∗ -9.457∗∗∗
(1.523) (3.323)
Rule of Law Index 12.916∗∗∗ 21.035∗∗∗
(3.599) (7.104)
Natural Log of Land Area in Square -0.644 -2.223∗
Kilometres (0.597) (1.290)
First Stage F Statistic 28.76 21.51 28.76 21.51
N 224 216 224 216
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗and ∗∗∗indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. The
instrument used for the corruption variable is distance from the equator.
in an attempt to obtain estimates which are clean of this endogeneity. DE has been used as an
instrument for general institutional quality in a range of papers such as Hall and Jones (1999)
and Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004). Treisman (2007) captures the intuition behind
using DE as an instrument for corruption well (when arguing that DE would not make a
good instrument for looking at the effect of economic development on corruption): “If settler
mortality led European colonists to create more exploitative, unaccountable governments
in countries with more tropical climates, closeness to the Equator might slow economic
development by encouraging corruption” (p226).4 Put at its most simple, the argument
can be represented as: tropical climate → more exploitative colonial government → more
corrupt post-colonial government.
The results of this 2SLS exercise are presented in Table 3. For both of the infrastructure
variables, corruption is a statistically significant factor. All specifications have first stage F
statistics that are satisfactory by the standard of the Staiger and Stock (1997) rule of thumb.
The IV strategy will be invalid if the above relationship is not strong enough or if DE is a
determinant of infrastructural quality outside of the instrument’s effect on corruption. The
former can be tested for using the standard weak instrument rule of thumb while the later
could be looked at using tests of over-identifying restrictions if there were more instruments.5
4This quote suggests that the settler mortality instrument of Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001)
would perhaps make a good instrument. However, this would lead to a greatly reduced sample that was
restricted to countries that had been colonised. Therefore it is not an avenue that I pursue here.
5When I use the ethnic fractionalisation measure of Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat and
Wacziarg (2003) as an additional instrument both the first stage F statistics and tests of over-identifying
9
Figure 3: Within Country Variation in Corruption
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4 Regional Level Results
The previous section established that the data points to a strong relationship between the
level of corruption in a country and its infrastructure and provided some evidence of an
effect running from corruption to infrastructure. The ES data provide a unique opportunity
to take the analysis to the regional level. Corruption is more often than not spoken of as
if there were no within country variation, perhaps because the most widely used measures
exist only at the country level. This is also somewhat true of discussions of infrastructure in
this literature. However, there are strong reasons to think that such variation may be large.
Certain regions may be more corrupt for cultural, historical or general economic reasons
while infrastructure may vary by region for similar reasons, in addition to geographical
considerations and perhaps due to variation in corruption. Figures 3 and 4 show that such
variation exists in the data. The upper and lower points on the bars show the maximum
and minimum regional values for each country while the points show the country average
(where the data are pooled over time). It is worth noting that this variation does not seem
correlate with the level i.e. the length of the bars does not tend to increase or decrease in
any obvious (linear) way as we move along the horizontal axes.
It must be noted that these regions are not always necessarily real administrative or geo-
graphical divisions. For example, Argentina is divided into Buenos Aires, Chaco, Cordoba,
Mendoza and Rosario while Armenia by contrast is divided into North, South East, South
restrictions are satisfactory. The results from this exercise lead to identical conclusions as those presented
here and are available on request.
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Figure 4: Within Country Variation in Transport Infrastructure
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West and Yerevan. Therefore one must bear in mind that the data may be somewhat noisy in
general and particularly so in some countries. I drop those countries that have only have one
region. These are mostly very small countries such as Burundi and Fiji. Each observation
is obtained by averaging the firm level data for each region (in each year where applicable).
In addition to the two infrastructure variables available in the macro data, the firm level
dataset contains a question that asks how much of an obstacle telecommunications is to
the firm’s current operations. Telecommunication infrastructure is obviously an important
element in the modern world. The ES measure has an advantage over the often used number
of telephone mainlines variable in that, as Wallsten (2001) points out, people can have more
than one line and some lines may be used by multiple people (p6). There is no regional
GDP variable in the dataset so, as a (somewhat crude) proxy, I use the average total cost
of labour to control for income. In addition, I control for the percentage of sales that are
national. It seems plausible that regions which produce more for the domestic market than
the foreign market could require different types of infrastructure and to different degrees.
Table 4 presents the results from estimating OLS regressions using this regional data. In the
case of each of the infrastructure variables, corruption is a sizeable and significant correlate.
Corruption can only explain a small proportion of the variation in infrastructure on its
own as can be seen from the R2 statistics in columns 1, 4 and 7. Given the wide range
of plausible determinants of regional infrastructure this is not surprising. The inclusion
of country fixed effects does not cause the corruption variable to lose its significance nor
does the inclusion of the additional controls. These controls are interesting in their own
right. Regions with a higher average total cost of labour tend to have better reported
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Table 4: Region Level Results I: Baseline Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Type of Infrastructure: Transport Electricity Telecommunications
Constant 0.167∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗ 0.021 0.307∗∗∗ 0.573∗∗∗ 0.650∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.086
(0.017) (0.076) (0.124) (0.025) (0.109) (0.182) (0.016) (0.057) (0.166)
Enterprise Surveys Corruption Measure 0.170∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗ 0.339∗∗∗ 0.354∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗ 0.341∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.086) (0.042) (0.054) (0.082) (0.056) (0.046) (0.063) (0.045)
Natural Log of Average Total Cost of -0.002 -0.041∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
Labour (0.006) (0.008) (0.006)
Average % of Sales That Are National 0.002∗ 0.002 -0.003∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Country Fixed Effects NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES NO
R2 0.05 0.51 0.08 0.08 0.73 0.18 0.18 0.53 0.25
N 438 438 437 438 438 437 402 402 402
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗and ∗∗∗indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
electricity infrastructure and worse telecommunications infrastructure on average. Regions
that produce more for the domestic market tend to have firms that are more satisfied with
the state of telecommunications infrastructure.
Table 5 splits the sample in the same way as was done above. Once again, the motivation
for this is that it is reasonable to expect that the relationship under study will vary across
the globe. Briefly, we can see that this is indeed the case. In Africa, for example, there is no
significant relationship between corruption and electricity infrastructure (Panel B) but there
is with the other infrastructure measures. The magnitude of the relationship also varies by
global region. In some cases, corruption alone can explain a large proportion of the variation
in infrastructure (e.g. Column 1 of Panel C). Thus the results of this region level analysis
support those of the country level analysis above.
There are no variables that can serve as instruments in the region level data - certainly none
that are fully satisfactory. This is unfortunate as the same arguments for endogeneity made
at the country level can be made at the regional level. The fact that the IV results at the
country level were in line with the OLS results does not necessarily mean that the same would
be true at the regional level. Two somewhat convincing instruments are firms’ perceptions
of how much of a constraint the courts system and customs and regulation procedures are to
their operations. These instruments have acceptable first stage F statistics and give results
in line with the OLS results presented in Table 4 and are available on request. The issue
with these exercises is that it is hard to argue that whatever factors may determine both
corruption and infrastructure do not also determine these instruments.
The region level data allows one to look at within country variation. We have seen that
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Table 5: Region Level Results II: Sample Splits
Panel A: Transport Infrastructure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Africa Europe & Central Asia Americas & Caribbean Rest of the World
Constant 0.182∗∗∗ 0.060 0.152∗∗∗ -0.109 0.169∗∗∗ -0.027 0.134∗∗∗ -0.117
(0.032) (0.454) (0.034) (0.173) (0.037) (0.195) (0.025) (0.288)
Enterprise Surveys Corruption Measure 0.341∗∗∗ 0.339∗∗∗ 0.166∗ 0.221∗∗∗ 0.101 0.147∗∗ 0.129∗ 0.117
(0.097) (0.104) (0.091) (0.077) (0.069) (0.057) (0.077) (0.083)
Natural Log of Average Total Cost 0.003 0.010 0.029∗∗∗ 0.009
of Labour (0.016) (0.009) (0.009) (0.020)
Average % of Sales That Are National 0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.002
(0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
R2 0.16 0.16 0.04 0.09 0.03 0.12 0.05 0.06
N 118 118 158 157 114 114 48 48
Panel B: Electricity Infrastructure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Africa Europe & Central Asia Americas & Caribbean Rest of the World
Constant 0.506∗∗∗ 0.485 0.189∗∗∗ 0.172 0.253∗∗∗ 0.362∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.808∗
(0.043) (0.480) (0.038) (0.299) (0.053) (0.200) (0.037) (0.429)
Enterprise Surveys Corruption Measure 0.104 0.174 0.498∗∗∗ 0.558∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗ 0.845∗∗∗ 0.823∗∗∗
(0.109) (0.127) (0.098) (0.084) (0.101) (0.095) (0.095) (0.098)
Natural Log of Average Total Cost -0.040∗∗ 0.004 0.013 -0.053∗∗
of Labour (0.018) (0.013) (0.015) (0.022)
Average % of Sales That Are National 0.005 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
R2 0.01 0.10 0.19 0.24 0.10 0.13 0.57 0.63
N 118 118 158 157 114 114 48 48
Panel C: Telecommunications Infrastructure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Africa Europe & Central Asia Americas & Caribbean Rest of the World
Constant 0.033 1.203∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.047 0.140∗∗∗ -0.791∗∗∗ 0.039 0.684
(0.023) (0.522) (0.037) (0.251) (0.043) (0.277) (0.027) (0.554)
Enterprise Surveys Corruption Measure 0.437∗∗∗ 0.399∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗ 0.384∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗ 0.282∗∗∗ 0.326∗∗ 0.392∗∗
(0.088) (0.081) (0.110) (0.102) (0.086) (0.071) (0.137) (0.151)
Natural Log of Average Total Cost 0.001 0.022∗ 0.060∗∗∗ -0.011
of Labour (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.024)
Average % of Sales That Are National -0.012∗∗∗ -0.002 0.001 -0.006
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
R2 0.32 0.44 0.12 0.17 0.07 0.23 0.22 0.28
N 97 97 155 155 112 112 38 38
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗and ∗∗∗indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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there is considerable variation in both infrastructure and corruption within countries. An
obvious next step is to see if the within country variation in infrastructure could be explained
by the within country variation in corruption. Some decisions regarding infrastructure, be
they decisions regarding the initial provision of infrastructure or the maintenance of existing
stocks, are likely to be made at a regional level. In the first column of Table 6, it can be seen
that regions with more corruption than the national average tend to have a lower level of
infrastructure in general, while the second and third columns show that regions with more
corruption than the national average also tend to have worse infrastructure than the national
average. The remaining columns show that this is not the case in all of our sub-sample and
infrastructure pairs.
5 Conclusions
The results of this paper demonstrate the link between corruption and infrastructure. This
link is robust to changes in the measures of both corruption and infrastructure. Another
contribution was some evidence that the relationship is one in which corruption determines
infrastructure. We also saw that this relationship can vary in both significance and magni-
tude depending on the type of infrastructure and the part of the world under consideration.
Extending the analysis to the regional level, it was shown that the relationship between
corruption and infrastructure is also evident. As was the case with the country level anal-
ysis, the results vary by pairs defined by global region and type of infrastructure. It was
also shown that within country variation matters. Regions with more corruption than their
national average tend to have worse infrastructure in general and relative to the national
average.
As the Enterprise Surveys continue, it may be become possible to create a panel data set (at
least at the country level) and examine some interesting temporal effects such as the effect
of lagged corruption on current infrastructure. Another very appealing line of inquiry would
be to examine spatial relationships between corruption and infrastructure both within and
across countries.
The implications of the results of this paper for policy can only reach the level of generalisa-
tion but may be informative for policy makers, in particular for those formulating policy in
a development context. A policy that sought development via investment in infrastructure
should take note of the setting and type of infrastructure. Further, given the large magni-
tude of the association and the IV evidence that the relationship runs from corruption to
infrastructure, curbing corruption may be a route worth considering if policy makers wish
to push for such development.
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Table 6: Region Level Results III: Within Country Variation
Panel A: Transport Infrastructure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Full Sample AFR ECA LAC RoW
Constant -0.042 -0.134 0.000 -0.252 -0.302∗ -0.074 -0.067
(0.124) (0.104) (0.063) (0.372) (0.167) (0.108) (0.193)
Enterprise Surveys Corruption Measure 0.278∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗ 0.098 0.362∗∗∗ 0.186∗ 0.469∗∗
Minus National Average (0.083) (0.061) (0.093) (0.135) (0.087) (0.106) (0.198)
Natural Log of Average Total Cost 0.003 0.007 0.007 0.016∗ 0.012 0.007
of Labour (0.006) (0.004) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013)
Average % of Sales That Are National 0.003∗∗∗ 0.000 0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Country Fixed Effects NO NO YES NO NO NO NO
Dependent Variable in Deviation from National Average NO YES YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.20 0.10 0.31
N 437 437 438 118 157 114 48
Panel B: Electricity Infrastructure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Full Sample AFR ECA LAC RoW
Constant 0.527∗∗∗ -0.019 -0.000 -0.229 -0.212 0.184 0.119
(0.201) (0.099) (0.096) (0.314) (0.179) (0.145) (0.223)
Enterprise Surveys Corruption Measure 0.284∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗ -0.026 0.145 0.697∗∗∗ 0.602∗∗∗
Minus National Average (0.107) (0.074) (0.090) (0.112) (0.120) (0.124) (0.166)
Natural Log of Average Total Cost -0.032∗∗∗ 0.004 0.004 0.016∗∗ -0.002 -0.006
of Labour (0.008) (0.005) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.014)
Average % of Sales That Are National 0.003∗ -0.000 0.002 0.000 -0.002 -0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Country Fixed Effects NO NO YES NO NO NO NO
Dependent Variable in Deviation from National Average NO YES YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.39 0.30
N 437 437 438 118 157 114 48
Panel C: Telecommunications Infrastructure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Full Sample AFR ECA LAC RoW
Constant -0.092 -0.092 -0.000 0.155 -0.118 -0.065 0.484
(0.186) (0.128) (0.046) (0.276) (0.206) (0.162) (0.450)
Enterprise Surveys Corruption Measure 0.288∗∗∗ 0.288∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗ 0.034 0.345∗∗∗ 0.362∗∗∗ 0.467∗∗
Minus National Average (0.091) (0.067) (0.076) (0.090) (0.125) (0.098) (0.214)
Natural Log of Average Total Cost 0.032∗∗∗ 0.005 -0.002 0.018∗ 0.016∗∗ -0.007
of Labour (0.006) (0.004) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.019)
Average % of Sales That Are National -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.004
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Country Fixed Effects NO NO YES NO NO NO NO
Dependent Variable in Deviation from National Average NO YES YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.12 0.17 0.23
N 402 402 402 97 155 112 38
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗and ∗∗∗indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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